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Summary:  In these remarks to an audience of union-side labour lawyers, I caution against 
excessive optimism concerning the potential of rights-based constitutional litigation to improve 
the lot of workers.   Despite recent pro-labour Charter decisions of the  Supreme Court of 
Canada, litigation will not fundamentally alter the underlying conditions which have 
disempowered  workers and unions.   This is not to say that the constitution is irrelevant, but 
rather that its most significant features are  economic and political,   rather than juridical.   
 
I    INTRODUCTION 
 
I’m here to talk to an audience of labour advocates who are out there doing  god’s  
work: defending the working class against the rampaging forces of hegemonic 
capitalism;  pushing back against a couple of centuries  of overt  judicial  hostility and a 
couple of decades of legislative indifference; trying to protect the rights, jobs  and dignity 
of  individuals  who basically have no other recourse.  So I’m here to talk to people 
whom I genuinely respect and admire.  And I’m here at what might seem like one of the 
few hopeful moments that labour lawyers have experienced for many years — a 
moment when the Supreme Court finally seems to “get it”, finally seems prepared to 
treat workers’ rights as universal,  fundamental and inalienable,  finally seems willing to 
overturn legislation and rewrite the common law  in order to vindicate those rights.   
Woodsworth said it best: “what bliss  it is in  this dawn to be alive!”    
 
If I had any sense, any compassion, any modicum of good manners,  I would just smile 
benignly, say “amen”, present my expense account, and depart.   And if this were 
indeed a blissful dawn, I would do just that.   But it isn’t, any more than Woodsworth’s 
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dawn was.  His “dawn” was the French Revolution which — having produced the 
forerunner of our Charter — soon descended into terror and turned towards 
dictatorship. I’m not predicting that the revolution in labour rights launched by the 
Supreme Court is heading in quite the same direction.  However,  my message today — 
a message you won’t want to hear — is that at best our dawn is a false dawn and that at 
worst our revolution in labour rights may end up, like so many others,  devouring its 
own.   
 
II  LABOUR RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHTS 
  
Let me say up front that  the notion that labour rights are fundamental rights, deserving 
of Charter protection, is on  its face an attractive proposition.  After all,  workers are 
neither commodities nor factors of production; they are citizens.  Surely  if  the Charter 
is used to protect citizens against  oppression and to ensure their freedom and equality 
in the larger society it should also apply in the workplace, a site of serious oppression, 
little freedom and endemic inequality.    
 
Moreover, from the labour’s point of view,  this new characterization of labour rights has 
some strategic attractions.  The labour movement is in serious trouble.  Workers no 
longer identify themselves as  producers but as consumers;  labour has therefore lost its 
raison d’etre as  a class-based economic  and political movement.  Moreover,  changes 
in labour markets and modes of production have also robbed the labour movement of 
much of its former economic power, while globalization has made its national focus 
increasingly anachronistic.  As a  consequence of these and other developments,  
workers  in most  advanced democracies  confront greater individual insecurity and loss 
of collective agency  than they have  in decades.   Arguably,  embedding labour rights in 
the  Charter  enables the labour movement to  rebuild its alliance with other rights-
seeking groups.  Engaging  with  constitutional rights  discourse  might conceivably 
renew its  intellectual energy  and refresh its message.  And finally, if labour could 
secure solid protections for workers comparable to those that other citizens’ movements 
have won  under the Charter, if workers’ rights  — to organize, to bargain, to  strike,  to 
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receive a living wage, to  enjoy decent working conditions, to have a voice in workplace 
decisions, to be treated with respect — if all of these  rights were reconceived  as 
Charter  rights, they  too could be constitutionalized; and they  too would be robustly 
protected.   That at least is the hope.         
 
II THE RIGHTS-BASED LITIGATION-DRIVEN JURIDICAL MODEL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM   
 
But what  does it mean to “constitutionalize” labour rights?  As I’ll explain in a minute, 
there are several possible ways to think about “constitutionalization”.  However, for most 
Canadian labour lawyers, constitutionalization  means first, that labour rights should be 
written into the constitution by amendment or judicial interpretation;  second, that no 
statute or legal doctrine  should be allowed to derogate from them; and third, that they 
should be justiciable, that workers  denied their rights should be able to secure  legal 
redress.  The results of constitutionalization would be transformative — so many 
believe;  the  costs would be minimal;  and the world would clearly be a better place.     
  
This  rights-based litigation-driven  model of constitutionalization beguiles not only CALL 
members but  friends of the labour movement,  progressive thinkers and legal scholars 
who believe in the transformative potential of law.  They all hope  that litigating 
constitutional rights  will  somehow succeed in balancing  capitalism’s  equation of 
unequal power,  ensure  social justice  and  put material flesh on the dry,  legal bones of 
the  liberal-democratic state.   But  now I  have to admit, if you haven’t already guessed:  
I am definitely not beguiled.  I am an advocate of labour rights;  a progressive; and (on a 
good day)  a scholar: but  I do not believe in the rights-based, litigation-driven model  of 
constitutionalism. 
 
That model  of constitutionalism  is found in its purest form in  the United States, whose 
fundamental law guarantees freedom of  association, assembly,  expression and 
procedural due process.   These guarantees might  have been interpreted  as protecting 
the right of workers  to join unions, strike and picket, and be dismissed only on notice 
and for cause.  But the courts held otherwise and labour’s rights were not 
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constitutionalized.  Perhaps this explains why  union membership in the private sector   
has fallen below  8%,  its lowest level in 100 years; why strikes are an endangered 
species; and why  workers are presumed to be employed “at will” and subject to 
dismissal without notice or recourse.  Or perhaps there are other explanations for 
labour’s failures in the United States.    
One way to evaluate the lessons of the American experience is to look at some 
international comparisons.   A  number of  European countries have  entrenched  labour 
rights in their constitutions. And, sure enough,  workers in those countries do seem to 
enjoy higher living standards,  greater job security  and more influence over their 
working lives than do  American workers.   But does this prove that  constitutionalization  
produces better outcomes for workers?  Or merely that countries where  there is 
widespread political  and social support for  decent treatment of workers  are more likely 
than others  to  constitutionalize  arrangements designed  to produce those outcomes?    
This much, however, is clear:  in few, if any, European  countries is  U.S.-style rights-
based constitutional litigation used to effect fundamental changes in workers’ 
protections or in labour market policies.    
 
Canada provides another  instructive comparison.   Over the past decade or so,  our  
appellate courts  have held that under the  Charter  workers have the right to associate 
in unions, to call on their employers to bargain in good faith with that union, to  picket 
and (perhaps) strike to advance  their interests, and to be protected against  legislative 
attempts to  restrict  those rights or to override  collectively bargained agreements.   The 
courts have also  ruled that the industrial torts and the common law of wrongful 
dismissal must be reconfigured to accord with  Charter principles.  Is this not proof-
positive that constitutionalization of workers’  rights will revive labour’s  flagging 
fortunes?     
 
Time will tell.  But  here is what time has told us so far:  Our second labour trilogy  —  
Dummore, Advance Cutting and Pepsi Cola, all favouring unions — was decided in 
2001 and 2002.   From then until 2008 —  the latest figures available —  union density 
fell by 1.5 – 2.0%.  That’s  about the same rate of decline as it has experienced over   
 5
the past thirty years.  Let’s update those figures.  Over the past two or three years 
labour has won several more Charter victories  —  notably BC Health Services and 
Fraser .   However,  from everything we know, union density has not miraculously 
improved nor has  union bargaining power taken a sudden spurt upwards.   And let’s  
look  down the road  twenty years:  we  can be pretty sure that  union membership, 
power and influence will have declined not grown;  that Canadian workers will enjoy the 
same wages or lower; that  their  jobs will be if anything more, not  less, precarious; and 
that the social safety net that protects them against the vicissitudes of the labour market 
will have  even more holes in it.   
 
If  the experience of the recent past and present means anything, and if my  prediction 
of the future is right, it seems clear that the Charter has failed, and will continue to fail,  
to protect labour’s rights and interests in the real world.  This is hardly surprising.  As  I 
tried to demonstrate  in an article I published a few years ago, all  available evidence 
suggests that we have vastly over-estimated the Charter’s  potential to  bring about 
social transformation.    A moment’s reflection on the American experience would have 
told us the same thing.   Here’s a country whose constitution has protected the 
fundamental rights of its citizens for the past  220 years; that has a hyper-developed 
rights jurisprudence; that has  some of the world’s most sophisticated constitutional 
lawyers, scholars and judges and a citizenry that is more rights-conscious than any 
other.  But  it’s also a country whose citizens  suffer from  greater racial and economic  
inequality than anywhere else in the developed world; whose  criminal justice system is 
more punitive and dysfunctional; whose  democratic institutions are  in gridlock;  whose 
Supreme Court has just awarded ownership of its political process  to  corporations and 
lobbyists; and not coincidentally, a country  whose working people and labour unions  
have been gradually but inexorably stripped of their rights and  protections.    
 
How can this be?   Rights-based  constitutional litigation ought in principle to be  the 
best safeguard for workers’ rights.   Alas,  in  practice litigation is unlikely to alter the 
deep structures of society and economy that relegate  workers to a subordinate role in 
their relations with employers.    There are many reasons why this is so.   
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Some of these have to do with the way constitutions are framed and interpreted: 
 
•  constitutions typically limit abuses perpetrated by state  actors — not private or 
corporate actors;  
•  labour rights are  necessarily couched in general language that can easily be 
read down;  
•  judges’ understanding of labour issues is often outdated: how else to explain 
why  the Supreme Court of Canada has embraced  collective bargaining over the 
past decade, just when  everyone else has given it up for dead?   
 
Some have to do with the whole notion of a litigation strategy: 
 
•  litigation is expensive, slow and  often  inaccessible to  individual workers or 
their  representatives;   
• evidentiary and procedural rules  generally make adjudication  unsuitable for the 
resolution of open-ended conflicts of social interests;   
• remedies that might fundamentally transform labour’s situation  would require a 
redistribution of wealth and power that courts lack the capacity to design,  a 
mandate to initiate or the means to implement;  
 
And some explanations have to do with the paradoxical quality  of  labour’s  encounters 
with law: 
 
•  by pursuing  their recourse  within the existing constitutional framework, workers 
would be implicitly  agreeing to abstain from using their economic and  political 
power in ways that would  radically alter that framework  —  a Faustian bargain 
they might  well come to regret.   
 
All of these considerations make me very doubtful  that a rights-based litigation-driven 
strategy will end up achieving much for workers or unions.    
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 III ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
 
However, as I suggested  earlier, the rights-based  litigation-driven  model of 
constitutionalization is not the only one available.  Many states — in both the global 
North and the global South  — have dealt with  labour rights in their  constitutions, often 
in  language that is merely  symbolic or evocative rather than tightly prescriptive.  Some 
of these constitutions   specify  that legislation should be enacted to regulate  
employment relations,  some  that the state should strive to achieve just labour market 
outcomes, and some  that employers and workers should  collaborate in the 
management of enterprises.   But  oddly, while these states have  “constitutionalized” 
labour  rights  they  seem to end up adopting very different  laws and  policies, 
constructing  very  different  labour market institutions and  achieving very different  
degrees of industrial peace, social justice and  national prosperity.   In fact,  there 
seems to be a  total  disjuncture  between  the constitutional model adopted to protect  
labour rights,  on the one hand, and actual workplace and labour market outcomes on 
the other.  I conclude therefore that  outcomes  are  almost wholly attributable to non-
constitutional  factors:  to national  demographies and  endowments,  to national 
histories and  cultures, and above all, to the forces of national and international political 
economy.    Nor is this counter-intuitive to anyone except lawyers. 
 
Now let me return to the  Canadian case.  The Charter is not the only aspect of our 
constitution that shapes labour law.  Federalism does as well.  In assigning  jurisdiction 
over labour matters  to the provinces rather than to the federal government,  the courts  
relied on constitutional  language that gave the provinces the right to legislate 
concerning  “matters of a merely local and private nature”  and those involving “civil [that 
is, contractual] rights”.   This  characterization  of labour matters had important  practical  
effects:  it  forestalled  the emergence of national labour standards  and labour market 
institutions;  it   prevented the federal government from implementing international 
labour standards without provincial  consent;   it  helped to dissolve  the national labour 
movement into  often weak and sometimes warring provincial movements;   it hampered  
attempts to launch a national social democratic  party; and it invited  regulatory 
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competition amongst the provinces, an invitation the Harris government in Ontario 
(amongst others) accepted with alacrity.   But  most importantly,  it constitutionalized  
contractualism as the  fundamental principle of labour law.   In other words, federalism 
rests on what I might call our political constitution – an array of beliefs about  the nature 
of our society and how it ought to be reflected in the organization  of the state.   
Here’s what I mean:  the old Snider view was that labour issues were matters for the 
parties to resolve contractually; the new BC Health Services view is that they are  
unusually sensitive matters engaging important public policies and warranting legislative 
attention that meets the highest democratic standards.   The old Labour Conventions 
view was that they are matters that have no inherent national or international dimension; 
the new BC Health Services view is that Canadian workers are entitled to the same 
protections  that  the international community requires  states to extend to all their 
citizens.   This is not simply  a change in thinking about the distribution of powers in our 
federation; it is something much more important: a fundamental revision of the political 
rationale underlying labour market regulation.   
 
Indeed, I will go farther.   The Charter itself, by protecting  mobility rights,  seems to 
acknowledge and reinforce  the existence of a national labour market.   It seems 
axiomatic, to me at least, that if there’s a national labour market, there should be 
national labour market regulation.   This is the principle that  underlies CPP and EI and 
federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements for social services and health care;  a 
principle that persuaded the provinces to  cobble together a Canada-wide regime of  
pension regulation; and a principle that will  become more explicit, pronounced and 
legitimate if the Supreme Court endorses the  proposed national securities regulator.   
If I’m right, if there is indeed a  shift in the locus of  labour market regulation, it will highly  
consequential for labour law and for the power of the labour movement.   Such a shift – 
to recapitulate - would result from  a fundamental revision of the way we characterize  
“labour”.  It would then have to be  understood a cause, not a result,  of  the Supreme 
Court’s change of heart over the past decade. 
 
However, things aren’t quite that simple.   Like the rest of our economy,  Canadian 
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labour markets and labour market regulation are in the process of becoming not merely 
national but  continental.   Given the  powerful influence in Canada of American public 
policies,  political culture,  legal concepts, financial capital and business ideology,   a 
new preamble  has been surreptitiously written into  the Constitution Act 1867.  Canada 
now has an economic constitution similar in principle to that of the United States.   This 
recital does not necessarily imply slavish imitation, nor does it necessarily have  juridical 
consequences, any more than did the old recital about having a political constitution  
similar in principle to that  of the United Kingdom.  But make no mistake:  under 
American tutelage,  we have accepted neo-liberalism as the default policy of  our 
political economy.    
 
This means that we will normally adhere to monetarist policies that enable governments 
to cool out labour markets  by raising interest rates;  that we will normally be taxation-
averse, thus making the welfare state unaffordable; that we will normally regulate labour 
markets as lightly as possible and dis-empower the agencies and tribunals we once 
trusted  to protect workers’ rights; and that we will normally privilege business interests 
over those of other stakeholders.  It also means that American and Canadian workers 
are now, more than ever, in competition for jobs both with each other and with workers 
offshore; that the trend to declining wages and benefits will prevail on both sides of the 
border; that strategies designed to  ensure  “union-free” workplaces will be peddled 
freely and pursued enthusiastically by both American and Canadian employers; and that 
HR policies designed to achieve flexibilization of the workforce will remain the universal  
response to global competition.     
 
I have discussed rights–based constitutionalism and what I have described as political 
and economic constitutionalism.   Next,  I want to say a word about a different kind of  
constitution that I will describe as  the “constitution of the enterprise”.   A good deal of 
research and debate in recent years has focussed on how  workers are integrated (or 
not integrated) into the governance of  the enterprise.   Here I’ll make special reference 
to North  American experience which admittedly lags far behind the experience  of many 
European countries whose actual experience,  in turn, lags far behind the ideal-type of 
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worker participation that is  supposed to prevail in those countries.     
 
In North America,  we have undertaken  four  experiments in enterprise governance, 
each of which was ostensibly designed to protect workers’   interests:    
 
• the collective bargaining model which attempted to endow  “citizens at work” with 
formal rights of association, voice and due process  analogous  to those they 
enjoy in the broader society;  
• the “stakeholder” model which  mandated  management decision-makers to  
address the best interests  not only  of  shareholders but also  of workers, 
customers, suppliers and other stakeholders forseeably affected by corporate 
action;   
• the “human capital” model  whose  rationale of  enlightened  self-interest  was 
meant to  persuade employers to treat  workers as valuable assets worthy of  
investment in the form of  good working conditions, benefits, amenities, training 
and, especially,  trust;  and  
• the “worker capitalist” model which reminded workers that  their  pension and 
other benefit  funds made them significant  members of  the  shareholding class, 
with  a stake in the success of predatory capitalism.   
 
As things turned  out,  all four  of these North American experiments in  
“constitutionalizing” labour’s  role in workplace governance failed.  They did so in part 
because they sought to reform workplace governance without  taking into account  the 
aggressive  form of  liberal market capitalism that prevails in North America,  and in part 
because they neither  acknowledged nor addressed  the internal political economy of 
the enterprise itself.    The constitution of the enterprise, it turns out, cannot be reformed 
in isolation from the juridical, political and economic constitutions of the state.   Or in 
another formulation:  varieties of capitalism give rise to  varieties of workplace 
constitutions,  not vice versa.   
 
    
 11
IV CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE 
 
Capitalism, as we all know,  operates not only within but across national borders.  Deep, 
institutionalized regional economic integration has been achieved  in Europe;  North 
America has gone some distance down that path;  and  regional trade regimes have 
begun to emerge in  Latin America, Asia and Africa.  The question is:  will it be possible 
to entrench  labour rights in whatever passes for the constitutions of  these regional 
regimes?    
 
Based on the European experience, one should  not be  too optimistic.   Even the  EU, 
which leads the world in this respect, has been oddly diffident  about entrenching   
collective labour rights in its “constitution”, though the Lisbon Charter seems to have 
moved the goalposts somewhat.   NAFTA has been even more diffident, though the   
NAALC does begin to construct a rickety institutional structure for the  protection of 
labour rights.   But  so far as I know, none of the other regional trade regimes has come 
close to entrenching labour rights, except perhaps in a symbolic sense.   What about  
the  WTO  with its global  mandate?  That organization has a  well developed dispute 
resolution process, and could in principle  require that its members comply with labour 
rights a condition of participation in in the world economy.  But it has resolutely refused 
to adopt such a requirement.  
  
That leaves the  International Labour Organization as the leading candidate for the 
protection of labour standards in the global economy.   The ILO has promulgated almost 
200 conventions defining the rights of workers; states that ratify  these conventions  are 
obliged, under the ILO charter, to  implement them.   Moreover,  the ILO has identified a 
core of labour rights whose implementation is required of all member states even 
without ratification,  simply by virtue of their membership in that organization.    And 
finally,  ILO conventions have clearly influenced  national laws and constitutions  by 
osmosis as well as by explicit adoption.  But does all of this confer  constitutional status 
on  the ILO’s 200 conventions or make them the fundamental  norms of  governance  in 
workplaces across the global economy?    By no means.   
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Clearly,  the entrenchment of  fundamental labour rights  in  global workplaces presents 
great challenges.  The very nature of global corporations makes them relatively 
impervious to transnational regulation.  Global workplaces  often  form part of a 
transnational value chain  linking  corporations  with widely-dispersed partner firms, 
subsidiaries and arm’s-length suppliers.   It is therefore often difficult for workers to 
identify their ultimate employer.    Second,  given that their operations can be moved 
relatively freely  to different sites  along the value chain, or  off-loaded entirely,  global 
employers are easily able to escape  both legal constraints imposed by national 
governments and  pressures generated by transnational  unions or social movements.  
Third, even if ILO norms were somehow “constitutionalized”, somehow embedded in 
national constitutions, would workers be able to take advantage of them?   Their ability 
to do so is radically  constrained because they are located in different countries, speak 
different languages, are regulated by different national laws, have different  (or no) 
traditions of concerted  action,  experience different material circumstances and social 
environments and  may not even realize that they share a common employer.    
 
These are  all  formidable practical barriers to constitutionalizing employment relations 
in global enterprises.   And let me add one more:  the workers most in need of  
protection are often located in the countries of the global south,  where labour standards 
are likely to be lower than in the global north.  However,  attempts to project  labour  
standards  from north to south  are almost certain to be regarded as a threat to the 
comparative advantage of developing countries and as the manifestation  of neo-
colonialism.     
 
So: the  constitutionalization of labour rights in the global context is almost  unthinkable 
for practical and political reasons.    And for  conceptual and institutional reasons as 
well.  There is, as yet, no  global constitution,  legislature, executive or judiciary, no  
global labour legislation, no  global  labour inspectorate or  global labour movement.  
These are all obvious impediments to the constitutionalization of labour rights on a 
global scale.  However, to be fair,  some evidence suggests that labour rights are taking 
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hold in places where they never existed before.   Under attack  from unions,  social 
movements and political opponents,  governments of  the home countries of global 
corporations sometimes try to persuade or pressure those corporations  to behave 
decently  when they operate abroad.  To  some extent  as well,  acceptable labour 
standards become  embedded in corporate  policies, practices and routines of work that  
are disseminated outward  from the head office to all the elements of  the global 
enterprise.   And finally,  to some extent,  ideas about labour rights — like ideas about 
sport, style and sex —  seem just to percolate across borders, at both the grassroots 
and the elite level;  through the media and by word of mouth;  and with both positive and 
negative consequences.     
  
I mention these promising developments  in order to suggest  that sometimes  
constitutions are  created  from the bottom up rather than the top down, that they may 
result from an accidental concatenation of unrelated events rather that  from the 
deliberations of august assemblies, that they may  be shaped  by  practical  struggles in 
particular domains rather than by the comprehensive designs of legal architects.  That 
certainly was the historic trajectory of the British constitution; and perhaps it will be the 
trajectory of  global constitutionalism  as well.    
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
I have framed this  last observation as a commentary on the constitutionalization of 
labour rights in the global economy.     But now, in conclusion, I will suggest that it 
applies as well to  domestic constitutions.    Clearly states  can adopt juridical 
constitutions; they can  entrench  labour rights; they can make those rights justiciable;  
they can authorize citizens to sue to  defend their rights; and they can authorize the 
courts to  award them remedies.  In fact,  this sort of constitutionalization proceeds  at  a 
manic pace:  since  1789  national constitutions  have had a median life span of  17 
years, and an  average life span of less than half that.     But what does this sort of 
constitutionalization  signify?    Do we really imagine that each new constitution brings 
fundamental change to the state that adopts it?  that rights made justiciable thereby 
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become effective in the real world?  that  citizens and workers  endowed with  those 
rights will actually be empowered?  that courts that acquire  remedial powers can and 
will  attempt to use them to realign the deep structures of  economy and polity?  and 
that if they do so, they will succeed in transforming global capitalism and making the 
world better  for workers?   
 
I have asked a series of  questions that are, in fact,  variations on a single theme:  
scepticism about rights-based, litigation-driven juridical models of constitutionalism.  But 
even though I’m a law professor, I know that I can’t end these remarks with questions 
nor will  scepticism  earn  me a graceful exit in this gathering of practical lawyers.   I  
therefore conclude by offering four  hypotheses about the future of labour law that are, 
in my view, entirely plausible:   
 
• the constitution that counts is the “real” constitution that expresses, normalizes,  
legitimates and therefore reinforces actual-existing relations of power:  this  is the 
political and economic constitution, not the juridical constitution what entrenches  
rights  and grounds litigation;  
• in the event of conflict, this “real” political and economic constitution will prevail  
over  juridical constitutions;   
• strategies designed to produce significant  change though  constitutional litigation 
will therefore prove in the long run to  be  disappointing for  labour; but    
• (my  final hypothesis) workers make constitutions, not the other way ‘round;   the 
history of labour law clearly demonstrates  that workers with an  inclination and  
capacity for collective action will find a way to vindicate their “rights” and protect 
their interests, whatever the  constitution might say, however the courts might 
rule  and whatever lawyers and law professors might tell them.   
 
  
 
  
